

Spillover effects of distribution grid tariffs in the internal electricity market: an argument for harmonization? Peak demand-based tariffs and storage

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Spillover effects of distribution grid tariffs

Redesign of distribution grid tariffs due to distributed storage, PV,...

Conclusions

Clean Energy Package: harmonized distribution tariff structures?

1. Direct (national) effect of distribution tariffs: implicit subsidies

Volumetric net-metering tariff (€/kWh) promotes PV Peak demand-based tariff (€/kW) promotes storage

2. Spillover – wholesale market effects?




Results

Conclusions

Modelling approach

Direct effects

Wholesale market effects







"Reference country": peak demand tariff (€/kW) => storage?

Peak reduction => distribution costs \downarrow => tariffs \uparrow => storage \uparrow

Price arbitrage => energy costs \downarrow => arbitrage potential \downarrow => storage \downarrow

Non-cooperative behavior



Market effect


Impact of "neighboring country"?

FIX: fixed tariff (€/year) NM: volumetric net-metering tariff (€/kWh)

PD: peak demand tariff (€/kW)







Conclusions

=> non-cooperative behavior

Methodology

Results

PD/FIX: storage neighboring country \downarrow => (initial) arbitrage potential => 3.3 GWh storage => costs +0.9%

Context

PD/PD: 2.3 GWh storage => costs +0.4%

PD/NM: PV neighboring country/ => arbitrage potential 11







Results

Conclusions

Neighboring country x5

PD/PD: 2.3 GWh storage => costs +0.4%

PD/FIX: storage neighboring country\ + market size /
=> arbitrage potential ///
=> 8.5 GWh storage => costs +3.8%


PD/NM: PV neighboring country 1 + market size 1 => arbitrage potential 1111


=> 7.8 GWh storage => costs +3.0%



Arbitrage potential => more storage

=> shift of focus to arbitrage





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Results

Conclusions

Conclusions

Spillovers in country with peak demand-based tariff from unharmonized distribution tariff in neighboring country?

Storage: positive
 less storage in N => more arbitrage potential
Welfare: negative
 more storage in R => more non-cooperative behavior
Country size has significant impact





Thank you!

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